Bio
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Graduate School of Economics, Finance, and Management at Goethe University Frankfurt.
My research interests lie in behavioral and experimental economics, with a focus on the cognitive foundations of economic decision-making, in particular the role of memory, attention, and communication in information processing and belief formation.
Curriculum Vitae (Updated November 2025)
How to pronounce my name
Email: zhuokun.liu@econ.uni-frankfurt.de
Address:
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Goethe University Frankfurt
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
Working Papers
Stereotypes and Memory
(with Huen Tat Au-Yeung)
Abstract (click to expand): Imperfect memory can sustain widely held stereotypes that are inaccurate. To establish causal evidence, we conduct an online experiment where subjects grade a gender-stereotyped quiz for a class of students and later predict their performances on a similar quiz. We vary (1) reliance on memory by manipulating access to grading records and (2) the class with different gender performance gap. We find that stereotypes—perceived gender performance gaps—persist more when subjects rely on memory, but only when the true performance contradicts stereotypes. This result holds only for group-level, but not for individual-level assessments. Then, we extend the standard Bayesian framework with imperfect memory and find evidence of memory attenuation: reliance on memory substantially reduces how accurately individuals incorporate previously observed performance into their beliefs.
Communication and the Polarization of Trust Attitudes
(with Ferdinand von Siemens)
Abstract (click to expand): Given the critical role of generalized trust in the functioning of both public and private organizations, it is important to better understand the factors driving the substantial differences in trust across states, regions, and organizations. Group polarization theory suggests that communication might foster consensus within, while increasing differences across social groups. To test this argument, we conduct an online experiment in which some participants communicate before playing separate trust games. Participants only communicate with other participants in the same role -- trustors talk with other trustors. Our results show that communication reduces the variation in trust within, while increasing trust differences between the chat groups, thus leading to a polarization of trust cultures. We further find that groups that develop strong positive trust cultures focus in their discussions on both moral principles and self-interest.
Work in Progress
Misleading Graphs
